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A B S T R A C T
The 2005 terrorist attacks in London and 2007 ﬂooding throughout the UK revealed the
shortcomings of the UK Government approach of ‘governing through resilience’ in
practice: low levels of stakeholder co-ordination, lack of understanding about critical
infrastructure interdependencies, and little attention to long-term adaptation. We found
that developing futures scenarios coupled with natural and malicious hazard episodes
provided an effective way to draw in key stakeholders to engage with and address these
problems. Starting with a detailed analysis of extant futures studies, scenarios were
combined with episodes in order to both draw stakeholders out of their institutional
contexts by setting the exercise in the future and to elicit participant responses during
future crisis events. A procedure was developed and applied to construct integrated
scenario-episodes built upon existing scenarios in order to investigate multi-stakeholder
interactions around the resilience of energy and transport infrastructures. The full
resulting scenario-episode narratives are also presented. These scenario-narratives were
applied in key stakeholder focus groups to address the gaps in the aforementioned
‘governing through resilience’. Participants actively engaged with these scenario-episodes
in order to highlight overlapping conceptualisations of ‘resilience’, identify critical
infrastructure interdependencies, and reﬂect deeper and more collaboratively on the
longer-term resilience implications.
 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY license. 1. Introduction
Multi-stakeholder discussions using futures-based scenario narratives are vital to draw in important actors in order to
build shared understandings of resilience, longer-term adaptation, and critical socio-technical interdependencies [2–5]. Key
actors in socio-technical resilience are then able to engage outside their narrow institutional and sectoral contexts to reﬂect
about resilience in a set of plausible future worlds. However, as we argue below, future scenarios by themselves often only
examine ‘business as usual’ settings. Actors only began to effectively interrogate critical interdependencies, overlaps (or
gaps) in understandings of resilience, and long-term adaption when we built in severe episodes to stress test the scenarios.
Thus, we developed a set of integrated scenario-episodes designed to engage a plurality of key stakeholders across sectors in
order to examine socio-technical resilience. Moreover, for scenario-episode development more generally, we found that* Corresponding author. Tel.: +44 (0)1206 873049.
E-mail address: isircar@essex.ac.uk (I. Sircar).
0016-3287   2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
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designed to concentrate on key interdependencies between different infrastructures. The UK government deﬁnes nine
critical national infrastructure sectors – water, energy, transport, emergency services, ﬁnancial services, food, government,
health, and communications [1].
Whilst decision-making and chains of responsibility may be well-established for particular infrastructures, critical points
of vulnerability exist where these sectors meet and where governance responsibility is more ambiguous and potentially
absent. In response, our scenario approach is explicitly geared towards analysing key interdependencies between sectors
and, crucially, making visible areas where oversight and responsibility may be lacking. Because developing scenarios to
examine interdependencies across all nine infrastructure sectors was beyond the scope of the project (and potentially overly
burdensome and complex for participants) we selected two speciﬁc interconnected infrastructures to focus on in order to
animate key relationships and issues of governance. In doing so, we applied our integrated scenario-episode approach to
address gaps in governing through resilience for interdependent energy and transport infrastructures.
This emphasis on connectivity across departments, organisations and sectors gained increasing prominence in the UK,
particularly since 2000. During 2000 and 2001, the UK Government experienced a series of severe and complex events:
protests and blockades in response to the level of tax on fuel led to reports that Britain had ‘ground to a halt’ [6];
unprecedented rainfall in October and November 2000 led to severe ﬂooding in Sussex, Kent, and Yorkshire [7]; and the foot-
and-mouth disease outbreak in July 2001 affected thousands of livestock and led to the culling of millions of animals, with
the British media placing blame on the Government response [8]. These events led the UK Government to undertake a
substantial overhaul of the national framework for emergency response. Responding to the aforementioned events, the
British Government established the Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS) in July 2001 to provide support, advice, and co-
ordination to government departments dealing with complex and severe emergencies that crosscut departmental
competence [9]. The shift in Government policy focussed around the concept of ‘resilience’, which was enshrined in the 2004
Civil Contingencies Act (CCA).
The new approach spread responsibility for emergency management across a greater number of agencies, sought to
provide a common understanding of ‘resilience’ in order to identify essential infrastructure necessary to ‘keep the country
running’, ﬁnd commonalities between different types of emergencies, and to better co-ordinate key actors in the face of
severe natural and malicious hazards. Despite the legislative innovation and institutionalisation of ‘governing through
resilience’ in the CCA, the 7 July 2005 bombings in London and the 2007 summer ﬂoods in the UK exposed continued
weaknesses in an effective and co-ordinated multi-sectoral response to severe events. These crises highlighted: the lack of a
common understanding of resilience; insufﬁcient co-ordinated response within and across key agencies; and little multi-
stakeholder deliberation on longer-term resilience or critical socio-technical interdependencies. Spreading the task of
delivering resilience across increasing numbers of state and non-state actors generates greater challenges for sharing
common priorities and, ultimately, new challenges of co-ordination and cohesion.
This paper sets out the provenance, development and wider utility of scenario-episodes to examine infrastructure
resilience. The paper proceeds as follows: the next section outlines the rationale for integrated scenario-episode futures; the
third section sets out the problems with engendering co-operation and long-term planning when ‘governing through
resilience’; the fourth section summarises how this procedure was used to create a set of integrated scenario-episode futures
related to infrastructure resilience; the ﬁfth section includes the full narratives of the scenarios and episodes; and the ﬁnal
section discusses and concludes.
2. Building integrated scenario-episodes: developing existing approaches
Within the Resilient Futures project,1 key stakeholders were engaged through the development of scenarios set in the
year 2050 integrated with natural and man-made hazard events, with a focus on socio-technical resilience regarding
interdependent energy and transport infrastructures. Futures scenario-based techniques can be a useful tool for developing a
set of comparable and plausible futures, which can be used to draw out the implications of particular socio-technical
conﬁgurations with differing beneﬁts and vulnerabilities [10–12]. However, existing scenarios are often not designed to
capture the uncertain and hazardous features of these worlds, nor examine transformative processes after a shock to the
system, for example, how critical infrastructures may affect one another. Thus, a number of novel modiﬁcations were applied
in order to help develop traditional scenario exercises meet the present-day challenges outlined above.
Emergency planners often examine existing levels of resilience through simulations or exercises in which malicious or
natural hazard episodes disrupt existing systems via a sudden ‘environmental jolt’ [13], and participants enact existing
response and recovery plans to return to the previous socio-technical status quo. In this paper, we use episode to mean a ‘rare
and severe event’. Thus we make a key distinction in our approach between scenarios – different versions of the future
amenable to interrogating issues of resilience that provide the context and broad parameters of the exercise – and episodes –
severe events and jolts that stress-test the resilience of various networks, infrastructures and organisations as they are1 Resilient Futures was supported by the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council; and the Economic and Social Research Council [grant
number EP/I005943/1], as part of the RCUK Global Uncertainties Programme. The project brings together expertise from complex systems modelling,
material science, risk management, sociology, geography, criminology, and social psychology. For more information see: http://r-futures.ecs.soton.ac.uk/.
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the Triton Exercise 2004 [14] that used a simulated tidal ﬂood) and full role-play simulations (e.g. the London Metropolitan
Police preparation for the 2012 Olympics by running a role-play exercise of a terrorist attack [15]).
Although these exercises can be helpful in highlighting vulnerabilities in current emergency planning practices, there are
two signiﬁcant shortcomings. First, these exercises focus on perturbations from ‘business as usual’, allowing stakeholders to
remain in their respective comfort zones, since participants are familiar with the social context in which these exercises occur.
The narrow focus on returning to the status quo during these exercises excludes the possibility of treating resilience as an open-
ended concept of recovery, adaptation, and evolution in an uncertain future [16–18]. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly,
these exercises only engage with events that provide a perturbation to the existing equilibrium to which the infrastructure
systems eventually return. However, the disasters that provide the sternest test for resilience are those that cause a
paradigmatic shift in thinking about the socio-technical nexus, in which natural hazards are compounded by human negligence
and cascade failures of complex interdependent infrastructure systems, leading to ‘corrosive social cycles’. To do this, it is
necessary to play out severe incidents in future scenarios to bring stakeholders out of their narrow institutional contexts in
order to create a space where they can question and be questioned about their assumptions related to the concept of resilience.
Thus, without playing out severe disaster episodes to ‘stress-test’ these future infrastructure scenarios, it is challenging
for infrastructure and emergency planners to evaluate how their policy decisions affect resilience in the coming decades and
how they must operate outside their institutional ‘silos’ to most effectively govern through resilience. To interrogate the
concept of socio-technical resilience across all three generations, we found it necessary to integrate appropriate future
scenarios alongside serious hazard episodes.
The integrated scenario-episodes were developed through a triangulation of several qualitative social-scientiﬁc
approaches, starting with an extensive review of relevant existing scenario-based studies. We began with a review of extant
scenario-based or future studies in the initial stage of scenario development for three primary reasons. First, access to high-
level strategic stakeholders is difﬁcult, and to expect repeated meetings to develop and then to test the scenarios given the
timeframe of the project would be difﬁcult. Second, consulting existing literature allows us to include a wider set of
perspectives in the scenario-building process compared to relying solely on interviews, and thirdly, the prevailing scenario
methodologies prescribe starting with individuals [4,19–21] instead of analysing past research. However, this assumes that
high-level stakeholders engage with scenario building (e.g. ﬁlling out consistency matrices) without assumptions about the
future built on understandings of existing studies. However, these actors tend to be well-informed, so engaging with these
stakeholders early without referring to extant studies would be unnecessarily duplicating previous work.
It is important to note that the review of relevant studies identiﬁed a set of common features and themes in order to
formulate a set of futures scenarios to interrogate stakeholder understandings of resilience in the face of severe hazards.
Reviewing the strengths and weaknesses of these individual studies was beyond the scope of the procedure. More
importantly, it is crucial to identify common drivers and characteristics across a broad range of these energy and transport
sectors – reviewing either existing energy-focussed or transport-focussed scenario studies in isolation would have helped
perpetuate the ‘silos’ between sectors and between infrastructure and emergency planners.
An important part of developing the scenarios and episodes to help engage key stakeholders is the use of detailed ‘stories’,
which must strike a ﬁne balance between plausibility yet not be embedded in the status quo. Narrative approaches have been
long recognised as an important currency of cultural experience. For example, approaches as temporally and conceptually
distinct as Aristotle’s ‘mimetic theory’ [22] and Le´vi–Strauss’s ‘Structural Anthropology’ [23] hold consensus on the power of
stories to engage people. More recently, such potency has been recognised across academic disciplines and in the development
of futures scenarios. Moreover, in the context of scenario-based future studies, narrative is used, since the alternative worlds
being explored are complex and difﬁcult to encapsulate using other more determinate methods employed in social inquiry.
Thus, the focus shifts from the realm of ‘evidence’ to that of storytelling, where establishing ‘what could be’ depends on
providing plausible future worlds that encourage suspension of belief [24,25]. However, scenario building is unlike ‘fanciful
dreaming’, and narratives must combine data, intuition, and creativity to effectively engage with participants [26]. It is also
important to set the scenario ‘future’ to both use a respondent’s expertise and to challenge the respondent to think beyond
current day-to-day operational responsibilities in order to better link the futures to present-day policymaking [27,28]. The
recommended timescales vary from: 5 to 10 years [29]; 10 to 30 years [30]; 20 to 25 years [11]; or even 50 years [31,32].
There are already a number of other existing scenario development methodologies outlined in the literature. For example,
Goodier et al. [2] proposed a causal mapping process with the following steps:1. Choose theme and create groups
2. Decide causal map goal/outcome and timeline
3. Individually brainstorm issues, factors and barriers
4. Place issues and factors onto the causal map timeline
5. Introduce additional issues and factors
6. Identify dependencies
7. Challenge the map
8. Identify pathways
9. Plenary session and questions10. Post-workshop production
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2. Develop common factors across the scenarios using a PEST analysis
3. Choose drivers and scenario details (for 2–4 scenarios) using the factors resulting from the PEST analysis
4. Check consistency of scenarios
5. Test for the robustness of the scenarios
Although the schemas differ signiﬁcantly, the scenario development in these processes share common steps:
identiﬁcation of key factors; deciding on drivers resulting in a set of scenarios; providing details of the scenarios guided by
the drivers and factors; and checking the plausibility of the scenarios.
In response, our method for developing the Resilient Futures integrated scenario-episodes included seven stages:1. Review of extant scenarios
2. Distillation of two primary drivers from existing studies
3. Use features from extant scenarios to conduct a PESTEL (political–economical–social–technical–environmental–legal)
analysis to identify basic scenario characteristics
4. Reﬁne and populate scenario details drawing on interview data with key stakeholders
5. Develop draft narratives of the four scenarios
6. Develop episodes to stress test scenarios (i.e. over three levels of resilience). Conduct further interviews with different key
stakeholders to check the plausibility of the episodes alongside the scenarios.
7. Final reﬁnement of the integrated scenario-episode narratives from stakeholder focus groups.
In addition to the common elements of scenario development found in previous procedures, our integrated scenario-
episodes are different in two signiﬁcant ways: use of extant studies; and integrating hazardous episodes into the scenarios.
3. Governing through resilience: background and shortcomings
The 2004 CCA sought to provide a policy shift in the UK by attempting to build a common understanding of ‘resilience’
amongst key actors in emergency planning and response. Analyses of resilience often break the concept down into three
generations [34]. The ﬁrst generation is that of robustness, i.e. how resistant a system is to hazards. The second generation of
resilience is response and recovery, which focuses on whether the system can ‘bounce back’ in the short term. The third
generation of resilience connotes adaptation and evolution, such that there is a progressive ‘bounce forward’ after a
hazardous event. Yet, as our research shows, this third generation is often underplayed.
The draft CCA (quoted in Walker and Broderick [35]) deﬁned resilience as ‘the ability to handle disruptive challenges that
can lead to or result in crisis’. The UK Cabinet Ofﬁce [36] later outlined four components necessary for resilience: resistance;
reliability; redundancy; and response and recovery. Thus, the essence of the CCA is multi-hazard planning; engaging a broad
range of structural and non-structural measures to mitigate potential hazards [3]. Although the aforementioned components
related to ﬁrst-generation (resistance and reliability) and second-generation resilience (redundancy, response, and
recovery), the UK Cabinet Ofﬁce [36] conceded the importance of third-generation resilience, so that the concept connotes
‘more than an ability to bounce back and recover from adversity and extends to the broader adaptive capacity gained from an
understanding of the risks and uncertainties in our environment. But for the purpose of this guidance [36], a narrower
deﬁnition [of resilience] has been adopted’.
During the Cold War, the UK focused on preparations in case of a Soviet ballistic missile attack on the US and its allies,
followed by conventional military invasion. The UK Ministry of Defence (MoD), intelligence services, and military were the
only agencies which would lead in the planning and preparedness against such attacks. By contrast, the CCA acknowledged a
wider set of both natural (e.g. extreme climate events) and man-made (e.g. terrorism) potential hazard events where the
threats are unknown, yet the responses to such crises have a high degree of commonality. Thus, according to the Home Ofﬁce,
‘[c]ertain features will be common in the response to a variety of different forms of disaster’ [37].
Hence, the CCA recognised the blurring between ‘natural’ and ‘man-made’ hazards, which lead to natural–technological
disasters [38–40]. These events, in turn, can lead to a continuous ‘corrosive social cycle’ of blame and impacts which result in
fundamental societal changes [40]. This type of ‘corrosive loop’ can also occur after terrorist attacks [40]. The resilience of
vital infrastructure is crucial in avoiding ‘corrosive social cycles’. To ‘keep the country running’, the UK Cabinet Ofﬁce deﬁned
nine sectors of critical national infrastructure (CNI) that provide ‘essential services’ without which normal day-to-day life in
the UK would be severely compromised: communications; emergency services; energy; ﬁnance; food; government; health;
transport; and water [1].
Overall, providing a common language for response, recovery and understandings of critical interdependencies in the face
of emergencies are crucial to governing through resilience, and this necessitates multi-sectoral stakeholder engagement
between local, regional, and national actors from different agencies. Unlike the previous prevailing practice, the UK Home
Ofﬁce [37] now encourages an integrated multi-agency response to emergencies. The Home Ofﬁce [37] also acknowledged
that the policies necessitated intra-organisational integration to optimise resilience. The multi-stakeholder approach to
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and local emergency plans which spell out the roles for different agencies during emergencies. Therefore, ofﬁces within
agencies have been created to operationalise resilience as it relates to an institution’s objectives, which proliferates the
number of stakeholders responsible for resilience.
Therefore, the current UK Government strategy is predicated on an approach that: harmonises understandings of
resilience amongst both responders and strategic decision-makers; widens the notion of types of emergency, ﬁnding
overlaps between man-made and natural hazard events; pays attention to critical infrastructure interdependencies; and
underlines the importance of multi-stakeholder interaction during emergencies.
Despite the UK Government attempts to ‘govern through resilience’, the July 2005 London bombings and 2007 UK ﬂoods
(after the ratiﬁcation of the CCA) laid bare continuing weaknesses in co-ordinated multi-agency response, recovery, and
adaptation after disasters. The Report of the 7 July 2005 Review Committee [41] concluded: ‘The plans, systems and
processes that are intended to provide a framework for the response to major incidents in London must be revised and
improved’. Similarly, the Pitt Review [42] of the 2007 ﬂoods found: ‘With no clear coordination and structure, responses to
ﬂood risk are piecemeal and not necessarily prioritised. Each of the organisations with a responsibility for ﬂood management
assets tends to carry out maintenance and improvement work independently, as there is currently little incentive to do
otherwise. Investment decisions made in isolation can lead to inefﬁciencies and can even increase the risk of ﬂooding’.
To address these critiques from the inquiries after the 7 July 2005 bombings and 2007 ﬂoods, it is necessary to bring key
strategic and operational stakeholders into a deliberative space outside their own sector-speciﬁc ‘silos’ in order to: discuss
different interpretations of resilience; reﬂect on their own assumptions about the term; think about how these notions affect
interdependent critical infrastructures; and move towards longer-term joined-up thinking about third-generation
resilience. Although we acknowledge and draw on the value of existing scenarios, we developed a set of futures scenarios
integrated with natural and malicious hazard episodes speciﬁcally to foreground these issues as a tool to tackle
aforementioned shortcomings of ‘governing through resilience’.
4. Applying the procedure to the Resilient Futures project
Using the procedure outlined above, we developed a number of integrated scenario-episodes set in the year 2050 to
engage with key strategic stakeholders and critically examine conceptualisations of resilience as they relate to critically
interdependent infrastructures.
4.1. Review of extant scenarios
At the start of the project, the investigators narrowed the scope of the study to focus on two sectors of CNI identiﬁed by
the UK’s Cabinet Ofﬁce – energy and transport – that cannot be considered separately during complex emergencies. Thus, we
identiﬁed a number of existing scenario-driven future studies focusing on energy and/or transport infrastructure (Table 1).
Although these extant studies focus on the UK/EU context, additional futures studies also exist examining energy and/or
transport scenarios in other settings, e.g. energy and transport in Australia in 2050 [49]; energy in Colombia by 2020 [50];
renewable energy pathways to 2050 in Saudi Arabia [51]; Russian gas exports to East Asia in 2030 [52]; and green technology
development in Asia in 2060 [53], amongst many others. The review of extant scenarios provided a means to guide the
formulation of the future scenario-episodes and is not an end-goal of the procedure per se. As mentioned in the introduction,Table 1
existing relevant scenario-based studies.
Future studies report (Year) Institution (Nation) Infrastructure
Focus
Scenario Type (cf. Borjeson et al. [11])
Powering our Lives: Sustainable
Energy Management and the
Built Environment (2008) [32]
Foresight, Government
Ofﬁce for Science (UK)
Energy Summary and quantitative data
(Normative – preserving scenario)
Intelligent Infrastructures Futures
(Towards 2055) (2006) [31]
Foresight, Government
Ofﬁce for Science (UK)
Transport Narrative only (Explorative – external scenario)
Energy to 2050 (2003) [43] International Energy
Agency (Global)
Energy Narrative and quantitative data (Predictive –
what if and Explorative – external scenarios)
Shell Energy Scenarios to 2050
(2008) [44]
Shell (Global) Energy Narrative and quantitative data (Predictive –
what if and Explorative – external scenarios)
Powering the Future: Mapping
our Low Carbon Path to 2050
(2009) [45]
Parsons Brinckerhoff (UK) Energy Summary and quantitative data (Normative –
preserving scenario)
Global Trends 2025: a Transformed
World (2008) [46]
National Intelligence
Council (US)
Energy and
Transport
Narrative only (Explorative – external scenario)
IPCC Special Report Emissions Scenarios:
Summary for Policymakers (2000) [47]
IPCC (Global) Energy and
Transport
Narrative and quantitative data (Predictive –
what if and Explorative – external scenarios)
Energy Scenarios 2050 (2009) [48] UKERC (UK) Energy and
Transport
Narrative and quantitative data (Predictive –
what if and Explorative – external scenarios)
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isolation) to avoid perpetuating prevailing sectoral ‘silos’.
4.2. Distil two primary drivers
Through careful examination of these existing future studies, there were a number of potential axes that could have been
used, but we opted for two axes that best interrogate socio-technical resilience related to both critically interdependent
energy and transport infrastructures. The year 2050 was deemed to allow for adequate time for infrastructure and
governance systems to transform signiﬁcantly, yet be close enough in the future for policy decisions initiating these changes
to be made in the not-too-distant future.
We identiﬁed the following as the primary axes upon which to build the scenarios: TTa
Rhe balance of infrastructure decentralisation/independency versus centralisation/interdependency.
 The extent to which social prosperity is presaged by greater technological innovation, including reciprocal infrastructure
investment.
This leads to four scenarios: iWorld: An interdependent, convergent world embracing new infrastructure technologies.
 Global Village: An interdependent, convergent world resisting new infrastructure technologies.
 High Tech Hamlets: An independent, divergent world embracing new infrastructure technologies.
 Local Power for Local People: An independent, divergent world resisting new infrastructure technologies.
4.3. Carry out PESTEL analysis
To further deﬁne these four scenarios, we carried out a detailed PESTEL analysis to draw out patterns amongst existing
relevant future studies relevant to energy and transport infrastructure sectors, which formed the basic skeletal narratives
with which we engaged experts during the ﬁrst round of key stakeholder interviews (Appendix 1).
4.4. Reﬁne and populate scenario details using interview data
To provide richer and more plausible scenario narratives, we identiﬁed a set of key stakeholders who engage with
strategic decisions related to energy and infrastructure resilience. These respondents included ofﬁcials from local resilience
forums, engineering ﬁrms, UK Government departments, risk management consultancies, and universities. We conducted
semi-structured interviews with the sample of stakeholders (n = 22).
We ensured that there were at least ﬁve interviewees discussing each scenario, although respondents could comment on
more than one scenario during the meeting. We asked questions around three broad themes: Healthy operation of energy and transport infrastructure
 Critical interdependencies between the energy and transport infrastructures
 Resilience strengths and weaknesses for a given scenario
Using the key stakeholder interviews, we obtained rich narrative data about the features and resiliency features for each
scenario from key experts. The features of the scenarios extracted from the ﬁrst round of interviews is summarised in Table 2.
The resilience beneﬁts and concerns for each scenario are compiled in Table 3. It is important to note that although we
derived the axes and basic descriptions of the scenarios through a careful review of existing studies instead of expert
interviews, there were no signiﬁcant objections to the foundations of the scenario development or the axes we selected.ble 2
-Futures scenarios.
Resisting new infrastructure technologies Embracing new infrastructure technologies
Interdependent, convergent world Global Village: Role of transnational institutions;
cohesive policy setting; focus on demand
reduction; global aims are manifest locally;
signiﬁcant focus on nuclear and renewable energy;
and very high density urbanism
iWorld: Internationally facing; solar arrays; dynamic
smart grid; high cost energy and transport; high level of
fuel poverty; many travel alternatives; and fewer
transport options for the poor
Independent, divergent world Local Power for Local People: National and insular
focus on energy production; reliance on ‘proven’
technology; primacy of geographies close to energy
production; localised micro-generation of power;
limited motorised transport; and ageing society
High Tech Hamlets: Regional energy; primacy of urban/
regional governance; localised micro-generation of
power; large regional disparities in wealth; little inter-
regional interoperability of systems
Table 3
Resilience beneﬁts and concerns in R-Futures scenarios.
Resilience beneﬁts Resilience concerns
Local Power for Local People Increased local responsibility for resilience
Local community cohesion and social capital
Less pressure on central government, fewer
bottlenecks
Varying resilience – less sharing of knowledge, skills
and resources
Rural areas are resilient, but urban areas are not
Every piece of infrastructure becomes critical – no
redundancy
High Tech Hamlets Decentralisation mitigates cascade failure
Local community responsiveness
Fosters relevant innovation
Problems of co-ordinating regionally
Lack of knowledge sharing and learning
Uneven resilience
Lack of support, backup and redundancy
Problems of exclusion
False sense of autonomy, hidden interdependencies
iWorld Ability to create standards of regulation Lack of relevance and responsiveness
Centralisation is efﬁcient but not resilient
Lack of capacity to account for human behaviour
Abdication of responsibility
Over reliance on technology
Global Village Active modes of transport (e.g. walking, cycling)
would be encouraged and are more resilient as
more adaptable (e.g. can be re-routed more easily).
Centralisation of infrastructure enables single point
failures to become cascade failures.
Terrorism becomes greater threat as transport enables
terrorist movement and presents centralised targets
but little technological mitigation possible.
Terrorism increases as social unrest is pervasive driven
by resistance to top-down governance system
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After the ﬁrst round of interviews, we brought together the basic features of each scenario, as well as strengths and
vulnerabilities identiﬁed by key stakeholders, as the starting point to compose more extended draft scenarios. As mentioned
in the previous section, it was important to write detailed story-like narratives to draw in expert respondents.Table 4
Anonymised list of interviewees consulted during the construction of the scenario-episodes (n = 29).
Area of expertise Hazard area Infrastructure group Sector
Rail transport security Terrorism Transport Public
Aviation sustainability All hazards Transport Private
Insurance Flooding n/a Academic
Flood risk Flooding n/a Public
Buildings and energy All hazards n/a Academic
Energy infrastructure All hazards Energy Private
Transport and society All hazards Transport Academic
Counter-terrorism Terrorism n/a Public
Counter-terrorism Terrorism n/a Public
Counter-terrorism Terrorism n/a Public
Rail transport and ﬂood risk Flooding Transport Public
Energy sustainability All hazards Energy Academic
Rail transport All hazards Transport Academic
Emergency preparedness All hazards n/a Public
Sustainability All hazards n/a n/a
Flood risk Flooding n/a Academic
Transport project management Flooding n/a Private
Critical infrastructure resilience All hazards n/a Academic
Urbanisation and sustainability All hazards n/a Academic
Emergency preparedness and response All hazards n/a Public
Emergency planning and business continuity All hazards n/a Public
Emergency preparedness and response All hazards Energy Public
Electricity networks All hazards Energy Private
Environmental consulting All hazards n/a Private
Design and sustainability All hazards n/a Academic
Risk management All hazards n/a Private
Logistics All hazards Transport Private
Sustainable transport All hazards Transport Academic
Construction All hazards Transport Academic
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We sought to engage with as many relevant strategic stakeholders as possible whose work is related to resilience. To do
this, we used a compound natural and malicious hazard episode to bring in individuals both from counter-terrorism and
ﬂood risk management (as they relate to energy and transport) at local, regional, and national levels using snowball
sampling. This allowed us to explore ways in which decision-makers from the two sectors can ﬁnd common ground and
provide a basis to reﬂect on the three generations of resilience. We sought events that would be realistic in the UK context,
yet be severe enough to induce ‘corrosive social cycles’, so we drew on past natural and malicious hazard events, namely
severe ﬂoods and terrorist attacks. For the ﬂooding event, we looked at ofﬁcial and secondary literature on: the 1953 ﬂoods in
the Netherlands and UK; 2011 Japanese earthquake and tsunami; and Hurricane Katrina. For the malicious hazard event, we
interviewed counter-terrorism experts and drew on past terrorist attacks, including: the 9/11 attacks; and the bombings in
London on 7 July 2005. The review of past episodes provided a basic outline for these crisis events, and we followed up with a
second set of interviews with key stakeholders (n = 7) to provide further narrative details about the scenarios alongside
narrative data about the episodes. An anonymised list of the 29 interviewees is shown in Table 4.
4.7. Final reﬁnement of the integrated scenario-episodes
We ran a stakeholder to pilot the draft narratives. To do this, we invited a set of key stakeholders (n = 20) with minimal overlap
between those interviewed for the scenario-episode development. Stakeholders were drawn from the academic, private, andBox 1. Full background narrative for iWorld
The costs posed by the threats of energy insecurity and climate change have united the world’s leaders and multinational
companies in pursuing advanced, though expensive, technological solutions. The UK government has led the way within
international forums, such as the EU, in mobilising all sectors of the economy in assembling new large-scale energy
infrastructures. The diverse energy attributes of particular countries are shared collectively on a continental scale across,
and beyond, Europe: massive solar arrays in North Africa power European cities in return for free trade agreements and
local infrastructure investment. An array of DC interconnectors links these modularised energy facilities into the
European Super Smart Grid (ESSG). However, despite assurances to the contrary, some groups claim these energy
agreements and technologies are a form of neo-imperialism – the newest phase of European exploitation of Africa.
At a control centre in Bavaria, the ESSG coordinates a dynamic balance of energy production technologies, storage
facilities, interconnectors and supply-side reduction technologies (including transport technologies) across the now 38
member strong European Union. The ESSG is a private company, owned by several large private investment bodies,
governed by a statutory body: the Congress of European Energy Regulation (CEER). Major energy companies continue to
supply energy to consumers via the ESSG. Whilst the CEER encourages energy security and efficiency, through various
regulatory mechanisms, it has been criticised for allowing special tariffs that enable customers to pay to override default
appliance settings for energy consumption. The ESSG defends such special tariffs as a necessary instrument to fund new
investment in technology. During emergencies, where supply/demand balance is threatened, a ‘‘critical’’ phase tariff is
introduced which allows power just for basic needs at a lower rate; consumers requiring additional energy are then
charged at an exponentially higher price throughout the emergency. As a result of extensive energy-sharing infra-
structure, political disagreements over energy policy, for example the construction of new nuclear power plants, become
increasingly played out within European rather than national parliaments, often creating protracted political negotiations.
Embedded power generation (i.e. micro-generation) is promoted and installation costs have fallen substantially, however
EU laws requires that such generation must be shared within the ESSG through a grid interface system.
Autonomous electric cars, powered either by batteries or in-road tracks, provide travel, within, and between, cities, road
freight is now largely reliant upon biodiesel. An increasing proportion of freight utilises newly electrified rail corridors to Asia
and the Middle East, especially as the cost of clean bunker fuels for shipping continues to increase. Air travel, by a range of
super-efficient aircraft remains the preferred means of intercontinental passenger transport. However, the high cost of air
travel places exceeds the means of most travellers, despite continued government subsidies and tax breaks. Within Europe
high speed trains are increasingly used for transcontinental travel, whilst extensive light rail schemes now dominate the
streets of most European cities. With the predominance of autonomous cars, and improved control systems in rail and air
travel, transport is increasingly integrated as different modes communicate to create webs of interconnectivity.
Energy and transport costs, national debts and taxation, have increased to pay for such massive investments in new
infrastructure; this has, in turn, increased fuel poverty, social inequalities and tightened public spending. By contrast, the
creation of novel, more desirable, infrastructure technologies such as high-speed rail networks that compete with air
travel across continents and autonomous road vehicles free of congestion, has actually encouraged more travel, and
prosperity, for the wealthy, despite increasing costs. The target of reducing GHG emissions by 80% is easily attained, as
countries and working together to address global problems, and energy security looks assured. And yet, fuel poverty
increases and there is markedly less energy and transport freedom: energy generation outside the ESSG and non-
autonomous vehicles are illegal, spurring new black markets in ‘‘offline’’ energy and transport. Police operations have
had some success in preventing the illegal import of fuels from North Africa and the Middle East though have been less
effective in tackling criminals who have hacked into domestic grid interface systems. Eco-terrorism is also prevalent as
groups respond when local environmental and economic concerns, such as a loss of local biodiversity due to biodiesel
plantations, are downplayed in national and supra-national infrastructure plans.
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to the R-Futures project and notions of the three generations of resilience. After this initial session, these stakeholders were
divided into four groups (one for each scenario). In each focus group (n  5), participants were introduced to the scenario and
asked to consider the strengths and weaknesses of the ‘world’ in 2050 guided by the three generations of resilience.
The facilitator then described the ﬁrst (ﬂooding) episode, after which the focus group discussed the ﬂood defence and
evacuation plans in place. After the ﬂood hits, the focus group considered the impact and response/recovery operation. In the
wake of the ﬂooding event (36 h afterwards), a surprise crisis episode takes place: a malicious attack on energy
infrastructure. The focus group then discussed the immediate impact, response, and recovery. Finally, to wrap up the
discussion, the facilitator asked the focus group participants to consider the long-term effects on the society in the given
scenario, thus including third-generation resilience into the integrated scenario-episode. Although participants were
encouraged to focus on immersion into the alternative world, not questioning the basis of the scenarios and episodes,
participants did have the possibility to suggest improvements. Any minor changes were included in the ﬁnal version of the
scenarios and episodes.
The approach outlined in the previous section produced rich, detailed narratives for the scenarios and complementary
episodes that draw out implications across the three generations of resilience. The full scenarios and episodes are included in
the next two sections.
5. Scenario narratives
Drawing on an integration of existing scenario building relevant to energy and transport infrastructure, the following
section includes detailed narratives for each scenario, which can be used off-the-shelf in conjunction with the full episode
narratives included in the next section.Box 2. Full background narrative for High Tech Hamlets
The UK has experienced a resurgent localism in response to a global energy and environmental crisis. The cost of energy
on global market has exponentially increased as states compete for diminishing fossil-fuel based resources. Powerful
elected regional assemblies have been established across England complementing those in Scotland, Wales and
Northern Ireland. Regional governance, coupled to increased power to local authorities, is intended to foster greater
self-sufficiency. Trade in energy is increasingly bilateral and even non-monetary. The London Assembly, for example,
negotiates a bilateral aviation fuel deal for Heathrow in exchange for professional services with the UAE.
Communities have adopted highly innovative infrastructure technologies in an effort to respond to local energy, and
transport problems. Political devolution has encouraged regionally divergent infrastructure companies that specialise to
exploit local resources and satisfy local needs. Public and private, regional energy service companies (RESCOs) provide
finance to householders and communities to construct sustainable energy solutions. These RESCOs increasingly
supplant centralised utility companies as the predominant energy investment instrument. Step-change in solar cell
efficiency, and the effects of climate change, has led to extensive solar farms in Southern England which complement
new nuclear power. In Scotland a ban on nuclear-sourced power has led to the development of extensive wind farms both
onshore and offshore alongside large scale hydroelectric and tidal power schemes.
Increasingly less interconnected electricity, and transport, networks mitigate the potential for cascade effects. During
critical episodes energy flows can still be enabled between regions providing essential backup. However these critical
transfers invoke substantially higher energy costs therefore incentivising increased self-sufficiency as the resilience
solution. In some rural areas of the UK the lack of regular investment in national transmission infrastructure has created
failures in the ability of energy grids to provide backup transfers during emergencies. As a result differentiation in
resilience is most pronounced in rural areas: some communities can afford to invest in elaborate backup systems to
regional power supplies whilst others cannot.
Transport technology varies greatly across the UK, some regions continue to support fossil fuelled powered cars whilst
other regions encourage the development of electric cars or fuel cell technology. There exists a high degree of divergence
in infrastructure technologies. In transport, intelligent vehicle infrastructures often lack regional interoperability (e.g.
between different battery exchange and charging systems), meaning that such technologies actually serve to further
inhibit long-distance travel, although this helps to further reduce GHG emissions. Intercity transport lacks investment and
coordination. The scope of ambitious intercity transport projects such as high speed rail has been scaled back. Some
regional airports and distribution hubs have been mothballed completely. And yet, as regional economies become
increasingly self-sufficient demand for intercity travel is greatly reduced. As the cost of food imports increases due to
higher energy costs and the lack of co-ordinated investment in infrastructure for centralised food distribution, meat and
processed foodstuff production and consumption decreases across most regions of the UK.
Public spending, debt and taxation differentiate regionally as investments are made in risky and expensive new energy
and transport technologies that tend to either spectacularly succeed or fail. Some regions, particularly those with a high-
technology skills base, easy access to sustainable energy resources, and a less energy dependent industrial base (e.g.
professional services) have achieved remarkable success in promoting local prosperity and environmental health whilst
ensuring energy security. However, the UK, as a whole, is falling short of meeting its 80% GHG reduction targets; for
many, such global agendas appear ever more irrelevant.
Box 3. Full background narrative for Global Village
Global agreements on energy and environmental security are paying dividends as the world looks set to achieve
ambitious GHG emission targets. Supra-national institutions, such as the UN, IMF and EU, have for years, provided a
forum for policymakers, businesses and NGOs to coordinate global action. In an effort to promote sustainability in the
developing world, developed nations focus on energy demand reduction and proven low carbon energy technologies
over costly, and risky, new energy and transport technologies. For some, these policies represent a form of neo-
colonialism as global trade with the developing world must now comply with strict environmental standards and energy
security protocols.
By-passes of local, and even national political bodies to implement supra-national polices become routine and create
increasing protest. For example, social unrest grows as fossil fuel powered vehicles are banned from all UK city centres by
the EU. Local successes in achieving energy efficiencies are celebrated and shared worldwide. However, supra-national
institutions are slow and unwieldy in responding to local environmental, transport and energy concerns.
Due to perceptions of unreliability, as well as their high cost, only a relatively limited number of energy interconnectors
exist between countries. This pattern of limited technical integration in electricity and gas transmission is appealing for
some whom advocate resistance to increased dependency on foreign energy markets. However various energy products,
particularly LPG, continue to be shipped into the UK. Embedded power generation is limited in scope due to a lack of
investment which has kept installation prices high. Technologies such as clean coal have failed to receive sufficient
investment to make a prominent impact. Instead the UK, alongside the rest of Europe, continues to be heavily dependent
on imported gas and nuclear alongside large-scale wind farms. This increasing lack of diversity in energy production is a
concern for many commentators. Nevertheless significant results in adapting consumer and industrial behaviour to
reduce energy demand, and improve efficiency through low-tech solutions (e.g. home insulation), has created a culture of
adaptability to threats to energy supplies.
In transport, the desire to travel globally, and consume global products, is maintained. Whilst global travel by air has
become more socially unacceptable, intercontinental travel by rail and sea has become cheaper and more popular,
alongside a considerable increase in global teleworking. In increasingly high-density urban conglomerations travel costs
are minimised and economies of scale in retro-fitting sustainable energy solutions are maximised.
Box 4. Full background narrative for Local Power for Local People
The world is experiencing a global depression partly caused by failed speculation by governments, investment funds and
multi-national companies in costly, and risky, new infrastructure technologies. As a result, the UK government has
adopted a ‘grassroots’ approach to tackling energy and transport challenges. Regional assemblies have been created to
promote self-sufficient economic activity within local communities. Regional and local political parties have been formed
that target resurgent local identities by reinforcing the value of energy self-sufficiency and independence. This localist
political environment helps achieve a degree of energy security and demand reduction; however it proves less successful
in developing low-carbon energy sources as regions inevitably harness their local energy resources.
Regional assemblies and a range of empowered local actors enable quicker and more responsive decision-making
processes. Social enterprises and charities have become more significant institutions in developing, and adapting,
energy and transport infrastructure. These organisations have helped make visible the costs of domestic energy and
transport. Social enterprises have also offered individuals, families and communities support to invest in technologies
that increase their self-sufficiency such as cavity-wall insulation and biomass heating. In some areas personal transport
and energy credits are introduced to reduce energy consumption. In many communities road vehicles cars are
increasingly publically rather than personally owned as the costs of vehicle ownership dramatically increases. Guided
buses and light rail become more popular in many urban areas. Coach networks and demand responsive buses offer
transport options between urban areas however intercity travel is greatly reduced. As economic activity is downscaled,
people are encouraged to live, work, shop and unwind within walking distance, improving environmental and public
health.
Less interdependent electricity, and transport, networks alleviate potential cascade failures. However the lack of regular
investment in national transmission infrastructure has created difficulties in the ability of more localised energy networks
to provide backup supply during emergencies. As a result many poorer communities that cannot afford extensive backup
protection have been forced to adapt to a less reliable energy supply.
Whilst national economic activity is greatly reduced as a result of declining trade and investment, wealth is often
distributed more evenly within most regions of the UK. Local co-operatives, owned by their employees, for example,
become a prevalent mode of business organisation. This shift to ‘‘the local’’ has, however, created winners and losers as
determined by the human and physical geography of a region. Poverty and ill health dramatically increase in some rural
areas, with lower population densities, older populations and less renewable potential. While compact urban settle-
ments, with access to nearby renewable resources can become relatively more successful. As a result urban densities
have increased even within small market towns. Some rural areas become progressively depopulated.
The consequences of poorer global pension funds, caused by massively weakened stock markets, have been partly offset
in some regions by increased multi-generational family habitation, providing social care and further reducing travel
needs. Yet, despite such decreases in energy consumption, the UK as a whole is struggling to achieve its 80% reduction in
GHG emissions, causing some regions to fear the effects of unmanageable climate change.
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In this scenario, there is a high level of connectivity and high acceptance of new technologies (upper right cell of Table 3)
(Box 1).
5.2. High Tech Hamlets
In this scenario, there are low levels of connectivity, yet there is a high level of acceptance of new technologies (upper left
cell of Table 3) (Box 2).
5.3. Global Village
In this scenario, there is a high level of connectivity, yet there are low levels of acceptance of new technologies (bottom
right cell of Table 3) (Box 3).
5.4. Local Power for Local People
In this scenario, there are low levels of connectivity and of accepting new technologies (bottom left cell of Table 3)
(Box 4).
6. Episode narratives
For the following episodes, the full narrative episode description will be followed by tables of additional features
relevant to one more of the scenarios. For the tables below, the scenarios will be abbreviated as follows: Global Village
(GV); Local Power for Local People (LP4LP); High Tech Hamlets (HTH); and iWorld (iW). Scenario-speciﬁc features of the
natural hazard episode are included in Box 6; and scenario-speciﬁc features of the malicious hazard episode are
included in Box 8.
6.1. Episode 1 – natural hazard
The full narrative background description of the ﬂood episode is in Box 5.Box 5. Full narrative background of the natural hazard episode for all scenarios
An unprecedented storm surge caused by a combination of high winds, low pressure and peak high tides develops at sea.
There is some uncertainty over the location and extent of the surge once it reaches land. However, advanced
meteorological forecasting techniques point to a likely channelling of the surge along an estuary that borders the main
commercial and residential urban centre.
Whilst flood defences do exist to protect valuable commercial sites upstream, continued unpredictable mid-21st century
extreme weather has raised questions over their need for replacement. The defences traverse the estuary and sit at the
border between high-density low-cost housing and valuable commercial sites upstream.
The surge enters the estuary as feared, overwhelming existing flood defences and spreads across several parts of one of
the densely populated inland areas inundating several thousand homes, key sections of the extra-urban road network and
threatening a local electricity substation and water-treatment plant.
Box 6. Scenario-specific features of the natural hazard episode
LP4LP: Neighbouring jurisdictions become affected by flooding and blame their plight on the failure of LP4LP to maintain
their defences. Overall cross-jurisdictional co-ordination of the emergency response becomes problematic as a multi-site
evacuation becomes needed.
HTH: Neighbouring jurisdictions become affected by flooding and blame their plight on the failure of HTH to maintain
their defences. Previous migration of highly skilled workers to HTH has further weakened their ability to respond.
Importation of energy is problematic given the restricted interoperability across regions. Neighbouring LRF commu-
nication systems also adopt different frequencies and bandwidths that further hamper cross ‘border’ assistance.
iW: Those from poor socio-economic classes, living in highest-density areas and having limited access to transport, are
hit hardest. As fuel prices increase and transport options recede, tensions escalate. Displacement of effects onto aging
infrastructure.
GV: Supra-national governance arrangements have dominated more localised recovery planning processes. Questions
are raised over whether plans are too generic and insufficiently tailored to exceptional and localised circumstances.
Box 7. Full narrative background of the malicious hazard episode for all scenarios
Concerns over growing socio-economic inequalities, particularly related to unequal access to fuel and transport, have
been intensifying since 2040. More radical elements have threatened direct action for some time and there is a sense that
some groups possess sufficient capability to do so.
Sensing a moment of opportunity, and capitalising on growing anger over the impact of the floods, that occurred
36 hours earlier, a terrorist group launches an attack on the pumps feeding a nearby power plant. The attack immediately
disables the cooling system causing dangerous overheating to occur. Initial safety measures fail and fires break out,
generating a thick plume of smoke that engulfs the local landscape. As people attempt to leave the area, the limited
remaining transport network becomes choked. The lack of electricity has also curtailed the ability to pump water into
another nearby power station, compounding energy shortages.
The terrorist group release a public statement that the attack was aimed at striking infrastructures they see as serving the
more privileged sections of society and symbolising their advantage. More attacks are threatened.
Box 8. Scenario-specific features of the malicious hazard episode
LP4LP: Continued demand on reduced energy production has reached its maximum capacity. Regional tensions mean
that the prospects for importing energy are small with limited political will and problems of interoperability across
regions. Of the options that do exist, energy is sold at an exorbitant price as other regions seek to profit from the disaster.
Significant social capital exists within the community and there are considerable numbers of people volunteering their
help. However, regular power shortages and increased tensions associated with the burgeoning informal economy mean
that people are starting to leave the region. . .
HTH: Significant social capital exists within the community and there are considerable numbers of people volunteering
their help. However, power shortages make it increasingly difficult to govern automated systems that are an embedded
feature of life in High-tech Hamlets (domestic energy, access control systems, transport). Amid such sustained difficulties,
people are starting to leave the region. . .
iW: Heavy reliance on technology exacerbates the impact of power shortages. Mobile communications are restricted and
smaller businesses with fewer resources for business continuity are hit hardest.
GV: Continued demand on reduced energy production has reached its maximum capacity. Talks are underway to gain
assistance and energy from other nations. However, this takes time and the (actual and perceived) distance of these
supra-national political bodies generate tensions at the local level. As power shortages increase and transport options
recede, further tensions escalate and reports of violence and looting begin to emerge. . .
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The full narrative background description of the terrorist attack episode, which follows the ﬂooding episode, is in Box 7.
7. Discussion and conclusions
The scenario-episodes generated were used to interrogate existing understandings amongst infrastructure and
emergency planners regarding the resilience of interdependent infrastructures in the face of severe natural and man-made
hazards. The procedure used to create the integrated scenario-episodes added to prevailing scenario development in two
ways. First, we conducted an extensive review of existing studies in order to identify the primary drivers and hence conduct
the PESTEL analysis. In this way, it was unnecessary to repeatedly interview stakeholders in the process of scenario
development. The review of extant studies found resonances between scenario studies across energy and transport
infrastructure sectors, which was found to be more instructive than considering the scenario studies individually. Second,
the approach adds tailored crisis episodes to ‘stress test’ the scenarios, instead of operating in ‘business as usual’
circumstances.
Despite the wholesale changes to emergency response and recovery contained in the CCA, the inquiries into the July 2005
bombings and 2007 ﬂoods highlighted that implementing the resilience-focussed approach remains difﬁcult. Crucially, our
scenario-episodes have addressed the gaps in governing through resilience identiﬁed above: different understandings and
priorities related to resilience within and across sectors and key agencies; insufﬁcient focus on interdependencies between
and within sectors that may lead to cascade failures; and little inter-agency understanding of resilience as it relates to long-
term adaptation after hazard events. All of these gaps were interrogated by bringing together key responders and decision-
makers in order to tackle existing narrow sectoral and institutional contexts. During the course of the interviews and focus
groups, participants shared their differing operational assumptions about their own concepts of resilience whilst engaging
with the futures presented, and how these differences might lead to inter-agency gaps or conﬂicts – and to cascading failures
in interdependent critical national infrastructures.
In the focus groups, participants were able to identify areas of overlap amongst themselves, particularly through the
prioritisation of the uncertainty of human behaviour in the recovery phase immediately after a disaster. Stakeholders also
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adaptation), largely absent in emergency planning and strategic infrastructure planning. As a result, key stakeholders were
able to come to an understanding regarding the different priorities and meanings of resilience across their respective
agencies, and appreciate how their actions have socio-technical consequences in complex interdependent energy and
transport infrastructures. Most importantly, these stakeholders engaged with the integrated future scenario-episodes to ﬁnd
a real-world shared understanding of long-term challenges related to socio-technical infrastructure resilience.
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ario (NIC 2008).iWorldPolitical Decline in governing role of
state and supra-national
organisations means increased
trade tariffs and restrictions
and more bilateral trade
agreements. [A2, RR, SC,
WWW]Decline in governing role of
state and supra-national
organisations means increased
trade tariffs and restrictions
and more bilateral trade
agreements. [RR, SC, WWW,
B2]Increased governing role of
supra-national organisations
means fewer trade tariffs and
restrictions. [CC, BL, A1]Increased governing role of
supra-national organisations
means fewer trade tariffs and
restrictions. [GG, CC, BL, B1]Increased importance of local
authorities and regional
bodies, including elected city
mayors and elected English
regional assemblies. [RR]Increased importance of local
authorities and regional
bodies, including elected city
mayors and elected English
regional assemblies. [RR]Declining importance of local
and national authorities. [GG]Declining importance of local
authorities and national
governments. [GG]Highly differentiated local, and
regional, tax policies provide
different outcomes on
decreasing GHG emissions and
energy-use. [RR, A2]Local, and regional, tax policies
provide different incentives for
new technologies and
innovation. [RR, SS]Rising importance of TNCs and
NGOs. [DC, BL, A1, PNL]Rising importance of TNCs and
NGOs. [DC, BL, PNL]Global, and supra-national,
consensus on taxation/policies
to reduce GHG emissions and
energy demand, including
substantial retroﬁtting of built
environment. [CC]Global consensus on tax
incentives for innovative
energy and transport
technologies, and GHG
emissions and demand
reduction taxes. [GG]Economic 1.5% UK economic growth but
highly differentiated across the
regions. [RR]‘Steady state economy’ circa
0.5% growth due to high energy
costs. [SS, B2]Circa 1.75% growth as more
trade though less innovation.
[CC]Circa 2% growth as more trade
and more innovation. [GG]Some regions are energy rich,
others energy poor due to
variations in natural resources.
[RR, A2]Some regions are energy rich,
others energy poor but energy
innovation and collective social
capital can offset natural
resource differences. [SS]Increased global trade in fossil
and nuclear fuels (and carbon
credits). [CC]Increased global trade
(including energy, knowledge,
carbon credits, and
conservation credits). [GG]Very noticeable regional
economic inequalities. [RR, A2]Greater regional economic
inequalities. [SS, B2]EU less has economic power
compared to BRIC nations. [CC,
WWW]Social More energy intensive
lifestyles. [DC]Less energy intensive lifestyles.
[SS]More energy intensive
lifestyles than today. [SC, A1]Less energy intensive lifestyles.
[CBNS, B1]More travel locally, and within
city-regions, but less nationally
or globally, including
migration. [RR, A2]Belief in collective social
wellbeing dominates over
material wealth. [SS, CBNS]Consumerism dominant as
marker of prosperity. [CC, DC,
A1]Belief in collective wellbeing
replaces individual material
wealth as marker of prosperity.
Focus on investment rather
than consumption led growth.
[B2, GG, CBNS]Belief in individual material
wealth dominates as marker of
prosperity. [RR, DC]Population stable at 69m in
2050 due to reduced net
migration.Population at 77m in 2050. Population at 77m in 2050.Population slowly declining at
69m in 2050 due to reduced
net migration.aState-funded reskilling of
workforce. [GG]Increased mobility of people,
goods and ideas. [A1]IPCC 2000); B2: B2 scenario (IPCC
scenario (IEA 2003); CC: ‘Carbon
resight 2008); LCR: ‘Low-carbon
C 2000); RR: ‘Resourceful regions’
K Climate Projections by DEFRA;
I. Sircar et al. / Futures 49 (2013) 49–6362Appendix A (Continued )Local Power for Local People High Tech Hamlets Global Village iWorldTechnological Domestic or community
energy generation,
infrastructure and storage
using locally favorable low, or
zero carbon sources (include
tidal, wind, hydro, solar, biogas,
biomass, CCS, extraction of
unconventional fossil fuels).
[RR]Domestic or community
energy generation,
infrastructure and storage
using locally favorable low, or
zero carbon source (including
ground source heat pumps,
biogas, micro-nuclear,
microbial fuel cells, wind, solar,
hydro, tidal, biomass, CCS). [SS]National energy generation,
infrastructure and storage
using varied mix of
technologies (include
renewables, CCS, nuclear,
biogas, biomass and especially
CCS, extraction of
unconventional fossil fuels).
[CC]National, and trans-national,
energy generation,
infrastructure and storage
using varied mix of
technologies (include Saharan
and Iberian solar arrays,
Scottish tidal, north sea wind,
CCS, nuclear (inc fusion) and
some embedded generation)
and smart grids. [GG, BS]Electricity and non-powered
sources used more for ground
transport. [CBNS, LCR]Hydrogen or electricity for
local, intelligent ground
transport (including
automated coach network)
depending on local preference.
[UKERC]International energy grid Electricity and hydrogen
sources used for intelligent
ground transport. [BS]Biofuels for aviation air travel
increases. [DC]Greater teleworking, less car
dependency more public
transport. [B2, GG]Electricity and hydrogen used
for private, non-automated,
ground transport. [CC, CBNS]Biofuels for aviation, air travel
decreases as less socially
acceptable. [UKERC]Focus on retroﬁtting cities and
rural housing. Continued sub-
urban sprawl and out-of-town
development. [RR]Biofuels used for aviation, but
air travel decreases. [LCR]Biofuels for aviation, air travel
increases. [UKERC]Focus on new build, compact
cities, less urban sprawl. [GG,
B1]Shift into new build higher
density housing away from
rural and older housing. [SS,
B2]Retroﬁtting of older properties,
suburban sprawl and out-of-
town development. [DC]More teleworking, less car
dependency more public
transport. [GG, B1]Environmental More well protected local
conservation areas, urban tree
cover and ﬂood meadows. [RR]More well protected local
conservation areas, urban tree
cover, grass roofs and ﬂood
meadows. [SS]‘Hard Engineering’ solutions to
ﬂooding preferred. Flood plain
development continues. [CC]‘Soft Engineering’ solutions to
ﬂooding. [SS]Lack of platform for global
consensus results in global
failure (despite UK success) in
meeting IPCC GHG targets. [A2]Lack of platform for global
consensus results in global
failure (despite UK success) in
meeting IPCC GHG targets. [B2,
OS]Global consensus results in
global success in meeting IPCC
GHG target. [B1]Global consensus results in
global success in meeting IPCC
GHG targets. [B1]Mean sea level change in UK up
26 cm and mean temperatures
up 2–3 8C in winter (UKCP09).Mean sea level change in UK up
18 cm and mean temperatures
up 1–2 8C in (UKCP09).Mean sea level change in UK up
26 cm and mean temperatures
up 2–3 8C in winter (UKCP09).Mean sea level change in UK up
18 cm and mean temperatures
up 1–2 8C in winter (UKCP09).
Legal Greater regional, as well as
local, devolution in some key
legal areas (e.g. planning,
transport, energy). [RR, A2]Greater regional, as well as
local, devolution in some key
legal areas (e.g. planning,
transport, energy). [RR, B2]Increased international law in
areas such as transport, energy
and environment. [CC, B1]Increased international legal
consensus in areas such as
transport, energy and
environment. [GG, B1]Reduced international law. [RR,
A2]Reduced international law and
institutions. [RR, B2]By-passes of local, and even
national, laws to prevent
NIMBYISM for developments of
global strategic importance.
[GG]By-passes of local, and even
national, laws to prevent
NIMBYISM for developments of
global strategic importance.
[GG]a ONS population predictions from 2009 (69.8 million in 2033, 45% net migration). The National Grid predicts a population of 77 million by 2050. The
current UK population is 61 million.
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